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The Business Perspective: Cross Border Views
William G. Deeks*
Openness in discussion is a remarkable characteristic of the U.S. andCanadian business relationship. Although we do disagree from time
to time, we are able to resolve a number of issues and agree to disagree on
others. As an illustration of how remarkable such openness is in our
business relationships, consider the following.
In the European Communities a few years ago, several countries
wanted to increase duties against imported metals, and having exper-
ienced this same problem in the United States, we immediately went to
our European customers and asked them whether they were aware of
what NORANDA's competitors were planning to do to the clients' sup-
ply line. NORANDA suggested that the customers contact the Euro-
pean Commission with their concerns. This suggestion precipitated a
flood of letters into the European Commission and a telephone call to
NORANDA from one of its competitors, berating the company for its
open approach to the problem-something that the competitor said
should never happen in the European Community. It is, of course, a
fairly common practice in North America.
A second illustration of how alien openness is outside North
America comes from Japan. NORANDA was contacted by a Japanese
firm that accused NORANDA of selling metal to Japanese industries at
too low a price. This accusation was based on the fact that NORANDA
was selling metals to three of the most prominent Japanese companies.
This was a significant loss of face to the Japanese metal industry because
in their view such companies could not possibly wish to buy from a for-
eign firm. In fact, each of the companies had sent delegations to Canada
hoping for a strategic alliance with NORANDA because of their forward
thinking and circumstances where metals might not always be available
in Japan.
From the Japanese example, it is clear that people always think that
a trade advantage is due to a company selling at a lower price and that
strategic alliances or strategic decisions have no role in building business
relationships. NORANDA has found that its practice of building strate-
gic alliances with its customers and the use of consumer power with sena-
tors and congressmen in a trade confrontation was probably the reason
that it preserved its U.S. trade access. Trade liberalization can only help
this cementing of business relationships.
* Senior Vice President, Global Issues, NORANDA, INC. (Toronto).
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The purpose of Chapter 19 is to provide a process that assures fair-
ness and the avoidance of undue political pressure on either the Canadian
or U.S. side in settling trade disputes. Simply defined, a trade dispute
involves an injury. An injury means lost sales, reduced production, re-
duced employment, lost profits and bankruptcy in the ultimate sense.
The instant reaction in this world of accelerated change has been to
blame the injury on someone else. The most convenient entity for taking
blame is a company sending imports into that particular country. Im-
ports are defined as excessive imports, less than fair value imports, or
subsidized imports. In the United States, experience has shown that a
business being injured does not receive government attention until the
import issue has been attacked.
Usually, an import can be alleged as the cause of injury because it
may be lower priced, it may be increasing at a rapid rate, or because
there is the perception that it comes from a subsidized industry. If the
injury is industry-wide, then filing a trade action is the only way an in-
dustry is permitted to have a legal combination against importers under
U.S. antitrust regulation. So the existing process, and this would be true
both in Canada and the United States, is structured to force the use of
trade remedy legislation as the first step for any business wishing to ad-
dress the problem of injury with the government, whether or not it truly
involves imports. In Canada-U.S. trade experience, imports have rarely,
if ever, actually been the significant cause of a company or industry in
either country being truly injured. In fact, in the trade actions
NORANDA has been involved in, the softwood lumber issue is the only
trade action that the company ever lost and this was due to the inability
to realize that a trade action is always first and foremost a political
action.
When a company is being injured, one must consider whether that
injury is the result of its own short-sighted or poor management, whether
it is the result of government policy which may have created an uneven
playing field, whether in today's global world the restriction on the abil-
ity to discuss a problem between competing companies because of com-
petition law requirements is realistic, and whether the processes of
discussion, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, might have a role in fu-
ture trade relationships.
Chapter 19 provides an opportunity for a better process than the
current one for trade resolution. The first step is for an injured company
to have an opportunity to talk to someone about the issue in an informal
manner like the Canada-U.S. Affairs Committee proposed. The Cham-
ber of Commerce had a subcommittee that dealt with this. Concepts of
mediation have the potential to depoliticize issues. There are well estab-
lished procedures from both Canada and the United States for discus-
sion, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration with compulsory
arbitration available if necessary.
Getting in the way of dispute resolution is the situation of those
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companies that do not wish to participate in a negotiated solution be-
cause they want to guard their patch. Competition law obstructs the
ability to discuss a problem and find a solution. The Justice Department
has always been on the importer's side because they see the process
before the U.S. International Trade Commission as anti-competitive.
Trade liberalization is the route to follow to create a dynamic global
competitive society.
For those companies that are being injured, there should be a pro-
cess to permit the injured company to informally start a discussion that
could lead to an arbitration process. It should be the first place a com-
pany goes. The process should, in effect, provide for bi-national review
of the issue. It does not necessarily need to deny the company ultimate
access to the conventional trade remedy process, but it must recognize
that cross border competition issues between Canada and the United
States so dealt with could be lifted out of trade issues with other coun-
tries. In that sense, part of a Canadian companies' problem has been the
fact that Canada is a major exporter to the United States, and as such,
has a large import market share in the United States. Thus, whenever a
trade action is being promulgated in the United States and Canada is
always included. A legal adviser will tell the plaintiff, that if he leaves
the Canadians out, the opposition will claim that it is the Canadian com-
panies, with their import share that are at fault. So often Canada is in-
volved without actually being the source of the problem.
Dumping results when an injured company can demonstrate that a
competitor is selling at less than fair value, defined as a lower realization
on an export sale at the FOB production point compared to a domestic
sale, or a sale at a price below cost of the product. One must also show
the less than fair value sale is the cause of injury.
In practice, this usually means that the import competitor is selling
at a price below that of the domestic competitor. It is hard to claim
injury unless someone has a better price. Although it is possibly due to a
better service, or the domestic supplier has not offered a comparable
quality or a comparable carrying for the customer. The difficulty lies in
determining whether the different prices are a function of efficiency, pro-
ductivity, superior service, superior products, the product of a govern-
ment practice, a subsidy practice, or a protectionist practice that allows
the domestic market to price at fifteen to twenty percent above the global
market and use that extra revenue to sell at a direct cost into the export
market. The latter is the Japanese model recognized by many other
countries, although even that is changing in Japan. It is not a clear-cut
case that a lower price is necessarily a subsidized trade threatening price,
but it can be.
Today, trade policy awareness and the greater transparency in all
these issues globally, makes it fairly easy for people examining the issue
to ascertain the truth, whether or not the truth is politically acceptable.
Historically, a predatory price usually involves a lower price. While
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there have not been many convictions or even cases under competition
law, one has to the establish that the intention of that lower price was to
put a company out of business, to limit competition in order to create a
more secure market for the competitor. Ultimately, an Ontario company
should be able to do business in Ohio on exactly the same terms and
conditions as a company from Pennsylvania.
There has been much discussion about Canada's extensive system of
government subsidies. Subsidies have to be reviewed to determine
whether the subsidy is intended to create a competitive advantage, and if
it is, it should be eliminated, regardless of whether it is intended to foster
an important political initiative.
Subsidies are pervasive throughout all government levels in both
Canada and the United States and there may be some that are so political
that they have to be dealt with on an individual basis. Conversely, a
subsidy generally means something that a government gives back to the
industry and to determine competitive advantage, one must look at what
the government takes away and then at what it gives back. One of the
startling facts is that Canadian business is taxed significantly more heav-
ily than U.S. business, and Canadian federal programs are significantly
more pervasive than they are in the United States. Case studies show that
a comparison of tax rates point up major differences.
Assuming that trade liberalization on a broad competitive base be-
comes bilateral, trilateral then global, this is a significant mechanism for
economic growth. It is obvious that domestic competition, a principal
focus for legislators, is not as important as it used to be. Competition is
the basic need for thriving businesses that expand through competition
for trade liberalization. Trade liberalization will make competition a
global issue and that may be the trigger mechanism that allows some of
the traditional mind sets to move forward. This requires a new set of
rules. Chapter 19 is a remarkable opportunity for Canada and the
United States. It provides the mechanism to create something truly new
in the trade management processes and this will be extremely important.
A hemispheric trading agreement could lead to an eventual global trad-
ing agreement.
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